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SELLING OUT
Andrew B. Dawsont

When bankruptcy policy competes with other federal and state regulatory
policies, which should take priority? Bankruptcy law, provided it is used to save a
struggling businessfrom having to close its doors. Bankruptcy's supremacy, then, can
preserve the debtor's going concern value, save jobs, and limit the collateraldamage
from a business failure. But should this bankruptcy supremacy apply only when the
debtor is pursuing a traditionalreorganizationunder chapter 11, or should it also
apply when bankruptcy is used to bring about a quick sale of substantiallyall of the
debtor's assets?
This Article addresses this question in the specific context offederal bankruptcy
law's conflict withfederal laborlaws, and it does so in the context of recentcoal mining
bankruptcies.Coal mining companies have filed bankruptcy with the goal of shedding
their labor obligations to current and retiredminers, and they have been successful at
doing so whether they have structured their bankruptcies as traditional
reorganizations or as asset sales. While the end result may look similar-in both
instances, the business line is continued in some shape-theprocess is quite different,
especially as to the balancingoffederal bankruptcy and laborpolicies. The Bankruptcy
Code's balancingof these interests,properlyinterpreted,requires the debtor to allocate
some of its bankruptcy-createdvalue to its collective bargainingunits-a requirement
that debtors have managed to sidestep when they structure their bankruptcy as asset
sales.
This finding has implicationsfor bankruptcy asset sales broadly andfor the role
of bankruptcy judges in chapter 11. While judges should not try to draw a sharp
distinction between traditionalreorganizationsand assetsales, they should enforce the
creditorprotections and distributionalnorms embodied in the Bankruptcy Code.

t Vice Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Miami.
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INTRODUCTION

When should bankruptcy law provide a means to reduce or avoid a
company's regulatory obligations in times of financial distress? The coal
industry provides a fascinating case study to consider this question. Over
the past four years, coal mining companies have been steadily heading to
bankruptcy court.1 Even with President Trump's pro-coal stance, eleven
coal companies have filed for bankruptcy during his term. 2

See Clifford Kraus, Murray Energy Is 8th Coal Company in a Year to Seek Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/business/energy-environment/
murray-energy-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/75WF-4Q9Z]; Becky Yerak, Bets on Coal End
Where They Started: In Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/bets-on-coal-end-where-they-started-in-bankruptcy- 11574604000
[https://perma.cc/
GT6J-TXNB] (reporting that roughly sixty percent of the nation's coal is mined by companies that
have been through bankruptcy in recent years).
2 Daniel Moritz-Rabson, Eleven Coal Companies Have Filedfor Bankruptcy Since Trump Took
Office, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 30, 2019, 2:36 PM) https://www.newsweek.com/eight-coal-companies-
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The coal industry has struggled to service their heavy debt loads as
demand for coal has plummeted at the same time as labor and regulatory
costs have increased. Faced with these struggles, coal mining companies
have turned to bankruptcy courts for a solution. And in turning to
bankruptcy for relief, they have all followed a similar playbook.
The coal mining industry's bankruptcy playbook has been to file
bankruptcy to facilitate a foreclosure sale for the secured lenders: the
debtor files bankruptcy with the aim to sell the company's assets to a new
entity owned by the senior secured lenders, and that sale is contingent on
court orders declaring that the new entity will not be liable for the debtor's
financial or regulatory obligations.3
The basic model of this playbook is familiar. It is the same model
that was used in the restructuring of the automobile industry during the
Great Recession, as General Motors and Chrysler pursued similar "quick
sale" bankruptcy cases. Scholars have analyzed the efficiency of these
quick asset sale cases and have proposed models to guide courts and
legislators on how these sales could be improved.4
There is an aspect to these coal mining quick sales, though, that has
been under-appreciated: To what extent does this quick sale playbook
affect the way that the Bankruptcy Code directs courts to balance
bankruptcy's pro-reorganization policy against competing federal
regulatory schemes, such as labor law?5
The Bankruptcy Code provides a balancing test to determine to what
extent a financially struggling business should be able to reduce its labor
and pension liabilities vis- -vis other claims against the debtor. That is,
to what extent should labor, pensioners, and other creditors "share the
pain" of the debtor's reorganization? Those specific Bankruptcy Code
have-filed-bankruptcy-since-trump-took-office-1468734 [https://perma.cc/WD34-XJQX] (listing
Armstrong Energy Inc., Mississippi Minerals, Mission Coal, Piney Woods Resources Inc.,
Westmoreland Coal, Trinity Coal, Cloud Peak Energy, Cambrian Holding, Blackjewel, Blackhawk
Mining, and Murray Energy).
3

See infra Part I (describing the path many of these coal mining bankruptcies have pursued).

4

See infra Section 11.A.

Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and the
Erosion ofFederalLaw, 71 STAN. L. REv. 879 (2019), as discussed further infra Section IV.A, likewise
use the coal mining companies as a way to examine the interaction of federal bankruptcy law with
pension and environmental obligations. While I agree with much of their argument, this Article
highlights the role of the asset sale procedure as a key mechanism that leads to the "erosion" of
other federal laws.
5
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tests, found in sections 1113 and 1114 of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, require the bankruptcy court to find that any proposal to cut labor
and pension obligations is "necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably."6
When a coal mining company seeks to reject its collective bargaining
and pension obligations as part of a quick sale playbook, it has had to
argue that these cuts were necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor. Even if the court accepts the argument that the cuts are necessary
for the asset sale, it must also determine that a bankruptcy foreclosure sale
is a "reorganization" for purposes of sections 1113 and 1114.
This Article examines how courts have addressed the question of
whether a foreclosure sale is a "reorganization" and examines the way this
interpretation strikes a new balance between bankruptcy and labor laws.
While the question of whether an asset sale is a "reorganization" is a
challenging one-empirical studies of bankruptcy "success," for example,
have struggled with how to characterize asset sales under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code-it is not a useful or practical interpretation
exercise. 7 Virtually any asset sale could be reconfigured as a
reorganization, albeit with different processes.
This Article thus argues that courts should instead focus on whether
the sale process distorts the distributional priorities embedded in those
balancing tests. This argument is consistent with the approaches
advocated by Mark Roe and David Skeel, Ralph Brubaker and Charles
Tabb, and the American Bankruptcy Institute's Commission to Study the
Reform of Chapter 11.8 This Article contributes to this argument by
highlighting the distributional priorities inherent in the processes for
rejecting labor and retirement benefits.
Understanding sections 1113 and 1114's distributional priorities,
the coal mining bankruptcy playbook should not work to permit these
companies to quickly shed their labor and retirement benefits in
bankruptcy.
While this argument focuses on labor and pension balancing, it has
implications for the way courts balance bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
policies more broadly. To what extent should environmental creditors
6

11 U.S.C. §§ 1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(f)(1)(A) (2018).

7 See infra note 125.

8 See infra Section 11.A.
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bear the burden of financial restructuring? To what extent should
bankruptcy policy honor corporate separateness when all or part of an
enterprise group files bankruptcy? And to what extent should bankruptcy
law provide a safe harbor from federal securities disclosure requirements?
This Article does not address these questions, but its argument implicates
each of them by focusing on the way that the quick sale model of
bankruptcy impacts the way bankruptcy law strikes these balances.
I.

THE COAL BANKRUPTCY PLAYBOOK

The setting for this bankruptcy dispute is the wake of the coal
industry crisis, with coal mining companies across the industry struggling
to compete with cheaper natural gas prices all the while continuing to
service their existing debt.9 A major portion of that existing debt comes
in the form of retiree health care benefits, provided pursuant to collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) with labor unions. 10
Labor costs are high because the companies' CBAs were negotiated
when coal prices were high.II They are also high because coal companies
have statutory obligations to fund retiree pensions.12 And President
Trump's coal-friendly policies encouraged investors to pump large sums
of money into the coal mining industry through the leveraged loan
market, in anticipation of the coal rebound that has not materialized. 13
When they filed for bankruptcy relief, one of the principal questions
is how the restructuring burden should be borne by different creditor

9 Micah Maidenberg, Miners Cut Back in Largest U.S. CoalRegion, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2018,
9:22 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/miners-cut-back-in-largest-u-s-coal-region- 11546264800
[https://perma.cc/V33E-MEDS].
lo Id.
11Kelly Poe, Walter Energy's Bankruptcy Is Biggest in Coal Industry Since 2012, AL.COM (July
18,
2015),
https://www.al.com/business/2015/07/walter energys bankruptcy is b.html
[https://perma.cc/6VRN-6GWL] (Walter Energy's attorney states that "[o]ur collective bargaining
agreement was negotiated when coal prices were much, much higher").
12

DAVID

M. HILLMAN, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP,

BANKRUPTCIES

change/hillman-

LABOR

LIABILITIES IN

COAL

(2016),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climatelabor liabilities in coal bankruptcy.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCU7-ZGZB].

13 Jonathan Schwarzberg, Coal Companies Return to U.S. Leveraged Loan Market, REUTERS
(Mar. 3, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-coal-loans-idUSKBN16A24I
[https://perma.cc/473G-JD66].
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groups. Restructuring requires reducing or wiping out existing claims
against the debtor-that is, bankruptcy reorganization requires imposing
costs on the creditors. One of the core bankruptcy functions is to
determine how those costs get distributed among creditors, what we refer
to as the relative priority of creditors' claims. When the coal companies
file bankruptcy in order to reorganize, one of the principal questions is
how their restructuring costs should be spread among various creditor
interests.
In this way, these coal mining bankruptcy cases raise important
questions about the interaction of federal bankruptcy law with state
corporate law, federal and state environmental laws, and federal laws
protecting retirees. 14 While some of these problems are unique to the coal
mining industry, the problem of dealing with large (and growing) legacy
labor costs is neither new nor limited to the coal mining industry.15
Bankruptcy law as a potential tool to modify or terminate retiree benefits
has deep roots. LTV Corp. made national news headlines back in 1986 for
doing precisely this. 16 And while the pressures of the coal mining
industries are unique in some ways-this is a heavily regulated business
in which worker and retiree benefits have long been a central concernthe legal issues presented here are common. Similar issues arise in retail
bankruptcy (SEARS and its pension plan plans), manufacturing (Hostess
Bakeries), and transportation (American Airlines, Delta, United
Airlines). 17
Walter Energy Industries provides a useful case study of this
dynamic. Walter Energy, like other bankruptcy coal miners, filed for
bankruptcy at a time when coal prices were at their lowest. At the same

14

See Macey & Salovaara, supra note 5.

15 Daniel

Keating, The ContinuingPuzzle of Collective BargainingAgreements in Bankruptcy,

35 WM. &MARY L. REV. 503 (1994).
16 Nancy L. Ross, LTV Unloads Pension Plans on U.S. Unit, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 1986),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1986/09/27/ltv-unloads-pension-plans-onus-unit/3f64f896-6aa8-4ce2-89a3-5eaa7798cOf7
[https://perma.cc/CV8W-3Q5S]; Thomas C.
Hayes, LTV Corp. Files for Bankruptcy; Debt Is $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/18/business/ltv-corp -files- for-bankruptcy-debt-is-4billion.html [https://perma.cc/N6B9-EL5H].
17 Andrew B. Dawson, Collective BargainingAgreements in CorporateReorganizations,84 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 103 (2010); Andrew B. Dawson. LaborActivism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97
(2015); Keating, supra note 15.
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time, they were parties to CBAs that were negotiated when coal demand
was on the rise. Walter Energy's CBAs had been negotiated back in 2011,
when coal prices were at their highest, only to find itself struggling to
meet its financial obligations as coal prices sank.is In addition to their
obligations under existing CBAs, coal companies have obligations to fund
retiree funds for coal mining companies that have failed, pursuant to the
Coal Act.19 Walter Energy stated that its obligations to employees and
retirees, including pensions and postretirement healthcare, were nearly
$600 million as of the end of 2014, with additional annual obligations
under the Coal Act.20
Not only did Walter Energy find itself with high labor costs, but by
the time it filed bankruptcy it was mortgaged to the hilt.21 Walter Energy,
as the coal mining companies that filed bankruptcy before it, entered
bankruptcy with substantially all of its assets pledged to its first and
second lien lenders. 22

Before it filed bankruptcy, Walter Energy's secured creditors
negotiated with the debtor to buy the company's assets through a
bankruptcy sale. Walter Energy, thus, filed for bankruptcy relief and then
filed a motion to sell its assets to the lender, free and clear of any claims

18 Debtors' Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1113(c) and 1114(g) for an Order (I)
Authorizing the Debtors to (A) Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements, (B) Implement Final
Labor Proposals, and (C) Terminate Retiree Benefits; and (II) Granting Related Relief at 2, In re
Walter Energy, Inc., 542 B.R. 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015) affd sub nom. United Mine Workers of
Am. 1974 Pension Plan & Tr. v. Walter Energy, Inc., 579 B.R. 603 (N.D. Ala. 2016), affd sub nom.
In re Walter Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 2:15-bk-02741) [hereinafter Debtors'
Motion Pursuant to ll U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1113(c) and 1114(g)].

19 Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act), 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (2018).
2u

Debtors' Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1113(c) and 1114(g), supra note 18, at 5.

21 Id. at 7.
22 Declaration of William G. Harvey in Support of First Day Motions, Walter Energy, 542 B.R.
859 (No. 2:15-bk-02741); Debtors' Motion for (A) An Order (I) Establishing Bidding Procedures
for the Sale(s) of All, or Substantially All, of the Debtors' Assets; (II) Approving Bid Protections;
(III) Establishing Procedures Relating to the Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts
and Unexpired Leases; (IV) Approving Form and Manner of the Sale, Cure and Other Notices; and
(V) Scheduling an Auction and a Hearing to Consider the Approval of the Sale(s); (B) Order(s) (I)
Approving the Sale(s) of the Debtors' Assets Free and Clear of Claims, Liens and Encumbrances;
and (II) Approving the Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases;
and (C) Certain Related Relief, Walter Energy, 542 B.R. 859 (No. 2:15-bk-02741) [hereinafter
Debtors' Sale Motion].
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against the estate. 23 That sale agreement was contingent on Walter Energy
obtaining a court order that the sale would be "free and clear" of Walter
Energy's debts and that the purchaser would not be bound by Walter
Energy's labor and pension obligations.24
Both of these moves-a "free and clear" sale of corporate assets and
a motion to reject the collective bargaining agreement as a precondition
to the sale-were standard practice in the coal mining bankruptcies
examined here. Alpha Natural Resources,25 Patriot Coal,26 Westmoreland
Coal,27 and Murray Energy28 have all used this same approach:
prepetition first lien lenders proposed to buy the debtor's business as a
going concern out of bankruptcy but only if the debtor first rejected its
CBAs. And the debtors have succeeded in rejecting their collective
bargaining obligations in every case in which the debtor has sought to do
S0.

29

The general asset sale model pursued here was not only common in
the coal mining cases, but it has been common practice (minus the labor
transformation part) in bankruptcy practice broadly over at least the past

Debtors' Sale Motion, supra note 22.
24 Declaration of William G. Harvey in Support of First Day Motions at 42, Walter Energy, 542
B.R. 859 (No. 2:15-bk-02741) (setting forth the milestones the debtor must obtain as the parties
pursued either a debt-for-equity swap or a sale of assets). By November 5, 2015, the debtors had
23

abandoned the debt-for-equity swap and pursued the free and clear sale. See Debtors' Sale Motion,
supra note 22.
25

In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., No. 15-33896-KRH, 2016 BL 423241 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 20,

2016).
26 Parsley v. Blackhawk Mining, LLC (In re Patriot Coal Corp.), No. 15-32450, 2018 BL 321899
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2018).
27 Trs. of the United Mine Workers of Am. v. Westmoreland Coal Co. (In re Westmoreland
Coal Co.), No. 18-35672, 2018 BL 483160 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2019).
28 In re Murray Energy Holdings Co., No. 19-56885, 2020 BL 195925 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio May
13, 2020).
29 As of the writing of this Article, Murray Energy has signaled that it might seek to reject its
collective bargaining agreements but has not yet done so. Murray Energy's Restructuring Support
Agreement, Murray Energy, 2020 BL 195925 (No. 19-56885), provides that the debtors

shall have (x) reached an agreement with the applicable authorized representatives of the
employees or retirees.., or (y) absent such agreement, filed a motion in form and
substance acceptable to the Required Consenting Superpriority Lenders in their
reasonable discretion under section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code for rejection of the
Debtors' collective bargaining agreements and under section 1114 of the Bankruptcy
Code for modification of the Debtors' retiree benefits (the "1113/1114 Motion").
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two decades.30 Scholars have examined this trend and its implications for
a long time now, reaching a crescendo perhaps when General Motors and
Chrysler both pursued the quick asset sale model in bankruptcy during
the Great Recession.31
What makes the coal mining cases a bit different is the labor
transformation element to the sale. And what makes In re Walter Energy,
Inc. interesting for this analysis is that litigation on this matter was
litigated and appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Otherwise,
though, the issues raised in that case underlay all of these coal mining
bankruptcies. Indeed, as this Article argues later, even though the labor
transformation is special, the way the Walter Energy court addressed this
issue has implications for the way courts balance bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy interests in all asset sale cases.
The Walter Energy court, in an opinion affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit, held that the power to reject CBAs is not limited to traditional
reorganizations but extends also to going concern sales.
The Eleventh Circuit considered this question and ultimately held
that, yes, asset sales are "reorganization" for purposes of rejecting labor
and retiree obligations.32 "Reorganization," the court held, "refer[s] to all
types of debt adjustment under Chapter 11, including a sale of assets on
a going-concern basis."33 As a result, a debtor has the power to reject
CBAs and slash retiree benefits not only when it is attempting to use
bankruptcy as part of a traditional reorganization but also when selling
substantially all of its assets pursuant to a section 363 sale.
The court reached this conclusion based on dictionary definitions of
the term "reorganization." The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language defines "reorganization" as "[a] reconstruction of a business
corporation, including a marked change in capital structure, often

3U

See infra Section 11.A.

31

See infra Section 11.A.

In re Walter Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2018). The court considered three issues,
only the last of which is discussed here. First, the court considered whether the Anti-Injunction Act
prohibited the bankruptcy court from terminating Walter Energy's obligation to pay retirement
premiums; second, whether the court erred in holding that the retiree benefits were "retiree
benefits" because they were not voluntary but rather statutory obligations; and third, whether the
court could enter a rejection order under section 1113 when the debtor was liquidating and not
reorganizing.
32

33

Id. at 1151.
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following a failure and receivership or bankruptcy trusteeship."34
Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online defines the term as "financial
reconstruction of a business concern."35 And Webster's Third New
International Dictionary defines it as "[t]he rehabilitation of the finances
of a business concern under procedures prescribed by federal bankruptcy
legislation."36 Drawing from these definitions, the court stated that a
reorganization requires that "the business concern must continue to
operate."37 Accordingly, an asset sale is a reorganization, the court
concluded, so long as "the debtor's business continues operating as a
going concern, albeit under new ownership."38
This approach, the court reasoned, fits within the overall structure
of the Bankruptcy Code and of chapter 11. Even though the Bankruptcy
Code titles chapter 7 "Liquidation" and chapter 11 "Reorganization,"
chapter 11 itself permits debtors to reorganize or liquidate under a debt
restructuring plan. Thus, concluded the court, "[b]ecause Chapter 11
permits both classic reorganization as well as liquidations, this title
suggests that Congress understood that the term 'reorganization' also
referred to some liquidations."39 In those reorganization-like
liquidations, debtors should therefore be able to exercise the powers of
section 1113.
Further, the court acknowledged that traditional reorganizations
and going concern sales are similar: "In these cases, the end result of a
Chapter 11 liquidation bears a close resemblance to the end result of a
classic reorganization in which creditors trade their debt for equity."40
Indeed, the similarity in result means that asset sales serve the same jobpreserving policy as does a traditional reorganization.41
The court did acknowledge one functional concern with this
approach. Namely, section 1114 contemplates a bargaining process.
What was there to bargain over where the debtor was not trying to reduce

34

Id. at 1153.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 1154.

39

Id.

Id. at 1153; see also Andrew B. Dawson, Better than Bankruptcy, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REv. 137
(2016) (arguing that state law asset sale procedures are effectively a reorganization process).
40

41

See Walter Energy, 911 F.3d at 1153.
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pension obligations (as it might do in a traditional reorganization) but
instead to eliminate them entirely in order to facilitate a sale? The retiree
health funds argued that there is no room for good faith bargaining when
the debtor's position is that the CBA and the retiree benefits must go, or
else the sale would fall through. The court rejected this argument as
prov[ing] too much. A bankruptcy court may terminate retiree
benefits under a Chapter 11 classic reorganization or liquidation
only when the termination is "necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor." See 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g)(3).
Because the termination will be, by definition, necessary for the
company to continue to operate, the authorized representative
will always be "hard pressed" to decline.42
The end result was that Walter Energy was then able to terminate its
pension obligations and sell its assets as a going concern to the purchaser,
with a court order declaring that no retiree liabilities would travel with
those assets.
II.

ASSET SALE MODEL "PLUS"

The example of Walter Energy's bankruptcy case and appeal
highlights the way quick asset sales in bankruptcy implicate the way
Congress balanced bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy policies in chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In a traditional reorganization, the debtor
would have to propose modifications to its CBAs or retirement plants and
prove that those proposed modifications were necessary to permit the
debtor to reorganize. In the sale context, the debtor can accomplish much
more: it can eliminate its labor obligations, and it can do so not by
showing that it would be necessary for its reorganization but only that
potential purchasers would not buy the assets absent this elimination.
To assess the impact of asset sales on the way the Bankruptcy Code
balances its pro-reorganization policy against labor policies, it is
important to first examine the basic framework of Walter Energy's plan,
the quick asset sale. The quick asset sale is typical of many large corporate
bankruptcies. As scholars have long argued, these quick asset sales raise

42

Id.

at 1156.
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serious concerns about whether the asset sales themselves are efficient.43
That is, do they maximize returns for creditors, or do they tend to shift
value from the estate to the secured creditors?
More recent scholarship has asked whether these asset sales are
consistent with creditors' state law entitlements under article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. If a core tenet of the dominant theoretical
model of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that bankruptcy law
should respect state law entitlements, are these asset sales consistent with
that theory? 44
After reviewing the literature on these two fundamental questions,
this Article will then turn to the labor and retiree aspects of Walter
Energy's case. The Bankruptcy Code has two specific sections dealing
with CBAs and retiree benefits, in sections 1113 and 1114, respectively.
Those sections provide the statutory test for balancing bankruptcy proreorganization policy against both labor and pension protections. They
do this, in part, by requiring courts to allow a debtor to modify its labor
obligations only if necessary to permit reorganization-a principal which
the Supreme Court first articulated in 1984. The principal behind that
policy is fairly clear and easy to understand: while the debtor should not
be able to easily cut its labor costs in bankruptcy, some labor cost cutting
may be necessary to prevent the debtor from shutting down. While this
principal is easy to understand, it is difficult to apply fairly and equitably.
Further, the interpretation of "necessary" has ultimately eroded the
redistributional entitlements embedded in this test.
A.

Quick Sale Model

The first aspect of the Walter Energy case that needs explanation is
the free-and-clear power in bankruptcy asset sales. The trend for decades
now has been away from traditional reorganizations and instead towards
a going concern sale of the business in bankruptcy. (See Figure 1).45
Because free and clear sales are often contrasted with a traditional
reorganization in bankruptcy, it may be helpful to start with that notion.

43

Infra Section 11.A.

44

Infra Section I.B.

45

Data gathered from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database. UCLA-LOPUCKI
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu [https://perma.cc/7KJD-XGVB].

BANKR. RES. DATABASE,
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Propr,-tion of 36xales
in Large Public Company Banr,uptcies

e

In g

r

The idea of a traditional corporate reorganization is that the
managers of a company can place the company into bankruptcy, operate
it through the bankruptcy, restructure the company's operations and
finances, and then emerge from bankruptcy as the same company. Thus,
ABC Corp. can seek bankruptcy protection, allowing ABC Corp.
management to continue operating the company but under the
protection of the Bankruptcy Code. With that protection, management
would have the necessary breathing room to negotiate a debt settlement
with its creditors. As long as that "plan of reorganization" receives
sufficient support from the classes of creditors and confirmation by the
court, the debtor can impose that plan even on dissenting creditors. Once
the court confirms the reorganization plan, ABC Corp. could then
emerge from bankruptcy with a restructured balanced sheet. The line of
business continues, preserving jobs and relationships with suppliers.
A going concern sale of the business can reach a nearly identical
result, albeit with a change in ownership. The managers of ABC Corp.
could place the company into bankruptcy and sell all, or substantially all,
of its assets to a purchaser. The purchaser would then continue the
business, thereby preserving jobs and relationships with suppliers. The
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proceeds of that sale would then be distributed in satisfaction of the
seller's debts.
Each of these procedures reaches a similar endpoint: the debtor's
going concern value is preserved, jobs are saved, and the disruptions of
business closure are avoided. They both, thus, advance the federal
bankruptcy policy of avoiding the "attendant loss of jobs and possible
misuse of economic resources" in a piecemeal liquidation.46 But these
goals are reached through different procedures, procedures which
balance the debtor's right to continue operating its business against
creditors' rights to receive a fair value in exchange for their claims.
The sale process, though, raises a couple of important questions.
First, courts may not be willing to approve a sale process that effectively
accomplishes a traditional reorganization's results but without its
protections. For example, a traditional reorganization process requires
disclosure to creditors, creditor approval, and then a court confirmation.
This process provides several means by which a creditor can object to the
proposed plan of reorganization, either individually or as a class.
Second, while asset purchasers do not generally assume the seller's
liabilities, there are state law exceptions to that rule, particularly when the
purchaser continues the seller's line of business.47 In such case, courts
may treat the purchaser as the seller's successor entity. Many successor
liability problems can be resolved by asking the court to approve the sale
"free and clear of any interest in such property."48

46

NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).

47 George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 FLA. ST. U. Bus. L.
REv. 9 (2007).
48

(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear
of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such
interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than
the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.
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While at one point in time there was some doubt as to whether this
provision applied to going concern sales, that is no longer really in doubt.
Courts frequently grant such requests even for sales of the business-the
asset sales of Chrysler and General Motors being perhaps the best-known
examples of this practice.49 But these bankruptcy asset sales were quite
common even before then.50 Scholars have analyzed the impact of this
trend in bankruptcy practice for a long time. Douglas Baird and Robert
Rasmussen wrote The End of Bankruptcy in 2002, arguing that traditional
reorganizations were obsolete.51 Bankruptcy law's chief function is to
create a central forum to coordinate a resolution of how to dispose of the
bankruptcy estate. With a robust market for selling small and large firms,
there are buyers with sufficient capital to purchase the business as a going
concern, thus eliminating the need for bankruptcy law's collective forum.
Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty wrote Bankruptcy Fire Sales in
2007, presenting evidence that these asset sales are inefficient and
suggesting that the trend towards asset sales was likely waning.52 Their
empirical analysis of quick asset sale cases compared with traditional
reorganizations found that asset sales yielded less than half the value of
traditional reorganizations, leading them to conclude that asset sales are
value destructive and that the asset sale trend was curtailing. Ayotte and
Morrison further examined the efficiency of asset sales in 2009, finding
that asset sale cases were directed by the senior secured lenders, whose
incentives were often not aligned with those of bankruptcy's goal to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. 53

11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018).
49 See Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling
Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375 (2010); Stephen J. Lubben, No BigDeal: The
GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel,
Assessing the ChryslerBankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010).

50 Lubben, supra note 49.
51

Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751

(2002).
52

Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007).

53

Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, CreditorControl and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J.

LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009).
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Sub Rosa Doctrine

The major check on this approach, in theory, is the sub rosa
doctrine, which courts have (rarely) invoked to prevent a debtor from
using a sale process to replace chapter 1l's distributional requirements.54
As the Braniff Airways court stated, "[t]he debtor and the Bankruptcy
Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11
for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the
plan sub rosa in connection with the sale of assets."55
There, the court cited three examples where the sale agreement
encroached upon chapter 1l 's creditor protections: part of the sale
proceeds would go only to former Braniff employees, shareholders, and
(some) unsecured creditors; the secured creditors would be required to
vote in favor of the post-sale reorganization plan; and the sale transaction
included a release of claims against the debtor, its officers and directors,
and its secured creditors.56 This doctrine, though, has done little work in
pushing back against asset sales.
Professors Brubaker and Tabb argue that any attempt to distinguish
between "true sales" and "traditional reorganization" is not particularly
helpful because any reorganization could be recast as an asset sale.57
Instead of the lender purchasing the assets, the deal could be restructured
with the debtor proposing a plan to issue equity in the newly reorganized
entity to satisfy the claims of the secured creditors. The reorganization
plan could discharge many of the company's old debts, allowing the new
owners to take control of a company with a rehabilitated balance sheet.
In both instances, the secured lender owns the business.
Because any attempt to distinguish a "sale" from a "reorganization"
is a waste of time, courts should instead focus solely on the distributional
consequences of the sale.58 That line drawing process is fact-intensive and
therefore expensive; but the real cost, they assert, is that courts will lose

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d
935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983).
54

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Brubaker & Tabb , supra note 49.

58 Id.

2020]

SELLING OUT

2537

sight of the distributional norms and entitlements of stakeholders5 9
Thus, they urge that courts should reject the debtor's chosen
reorganizational vehicle only if "the mechanism used impairs or obstructs
the court's ability to fulfill [its] central protective role." 60
Professors Roe and Skeel have likewise criticized these sales as
violating bankruptcy norms. 61 Focusing on Chrysler, they argued that the
asset sale procedure shifted money from secured creditors to pensioners.
However defensible that redistribution might be from a policy
standpoint, it fails to comport with the creditors' pre-established rights.
They therefore suggested three "makeshift safeguards" that can permit
going concern sales under section 363 without losing essential creditor
protections found in the section 1129 plan confirmation requirements.62
These safeguards are judicial valuation of the assets, creditor consent, and
a sale process that leads to a contested auction.63 If we have these, then
our concerns about creditor protections and priority skipping should be
allayed.
The American Bankruptcy Institute's legislative reform project has
proposed legislative reforms that would adopt some of these safeguards.
The Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, a collaborative
legislative reform project that brought together practitioners and
academics to make proposals for amending chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, considered the sale versus reorganization issue and has proposed a
form of the Roe/Skeel approach: debtors should be able to sell
substantially all assets outside of the plan; however, the sale process must
incorporate the fundamental creditor protections embedded in the plan
confirmation requirements.64
The takeaway from all three approaches is: (a) going concern sales
can result in a quasi-reorganization outcome and that (b) this is not a
cause for concern except to the extent it skirts creditor priorities and
protections. That is, chapter 1il's creditor protections and priorities are a
fundamental part of chapter 1il's governance structure. The debtor gets

59

Id.

6U

Id. at 1379.

61

Roe & Skeel, supra note 49.

62

Id. at 739.

63

Id.

64

COMM'N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., 2012-2014 FINAL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 201-06 (2014).
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to stay in control of the business in exchange for the Code's creditor
protections. If the debtor were to instead file under chapter 7 and cede
control of the business to a trustee, these protections would be only those
lesser protections available to creditors under chapter 7.
Absent legislative reform, there is some possibility of reform in asset
sale cases as the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of
procedural protections in some asset sale cases. Although Czyzewski v.
Jevic Holding Corp.65 perhaps does not merit much discussion in this
Article because of its unique procedural posture, it does provide a basis
for arguments about procedurally-based distributional entitlements. The
case involved an asset sale to be followed immediately by a "structured
dismissal," in which the debtor would settle its claims with creditors and
immediately move to dismiss the case. In ruling that such structured
dismissals are not permitted under the Bankruptcy Code, the Court
focused on the Code's statutory priorities, holding that debtors cannot
sidestep those priorities through an end of case distribution. As Jonathan
Lipson points out, this ruling is facially about statutory priorities, but it
rests upon the logic of procedure. "Priority lives a dual life," he argues,
explaining that priority "is a substantive doctrine about the distribution
of property, but it also has strong procedural effects."66 Priority is about
substantive rights to distribution from the bankruptcy estate, and these
substantive distributional rights grant the priority creditor control over
the estate. 67 In making this argument, Professor Lipson draws heavily
from the earlier seminal work of Jay Westbrook, in which Westbrook
memorably wrote "[c]ontrol is the function of bankruptcy; priority is the
end for which it is employed."68
Chapters 7 and 11 strike balances of creditor governance and
creditor protection: when creditors gain control over the debtor in
chapter 7, we see fewer creditor protections; when governance is left in
the debtor's control in Chapter 11, creditor protections are more
pervasive. The debtor cannot simultaneously evade the Chapter 7

65 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 979 (2017); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret
Life of Priority:CorporateReorganizationAfter Jevic, 93 WASH. L. REv. 631 (2018).
66

Lipson, supra note 65, at 685.

67

Id.

Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 795, 797
(2004).
68
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governance and the chapter 11 priority system. This can be read, as
Professor Pamela Foohey argues, as preventing those in control from
"circumvent[ing] the Code's procedural protections" even in areas
outside of structured dismissals.69 And while Foohey may be right that
courts can (should) look to these procedural protections as reflecting
something more than statutory priorities, it is unclear if Jevic will do
much more than just that.
2.

State Law Entitlements

Professors Melissa Jacoby and Ted Janger have approached these
asset sale cases from another tack. Their concerns are both procedural
and substantive. Procedurally, they take up the LoPucki and Doherty Fire
Sales argument. Asset sales might at times need to be speedy (when the
bankruptcy estate is like a melting ice cube, dripping away value with each
passing day), but other times the speed might actually depress the value
of the assets. They have proposed a procedural "fix" that could slow down
asset sales, helping to prevent these sales from yielding only fire sale
prices.70 They propose the use of "Ice Cube Bonds:" if a sale proponent
wants to rush an asset sale because of concerns that estate value is melting
away, the sale proponent could be required to post a bond to insure
against this risk.
Their second concern is that these asset sales shift more value to the
secured creditors than they are entitled to receive under state law. They
draw on Westbrook's work on article 9 security interests and bankruptcy
control.71 Secured creditors exercise control over asset sales in
bankruptcy because they claim an interest in all, or substantially all, of the
debtor's assets. Jacoby and Janger question whether this "blanket lien" on
the debtor's assets includes the going concern value associated with those
assets. Jacoby and Janger examine this assumption, arguing that the
blanket lien does not cover the entirety of the going concern sale value;
rather, the sale proceeds should be divided into "value traceable to
69 Pamela Foohey, Jevic's Promise: ProceduralJustice in Chapter 11, 93 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE
128, 136 (2018).

7U Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 869-72 (2014).
71

Id. at 926 n.231.
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encumbered assets and other value."72 The secured parties' lien attaches
only to the value traceable to their encumbered assets. The other valuewhich is the bankruptcy-created value-belongs to the estate.
All of these approaches trend away from distinguishing between
reorganization and asset sales and towards focusing on honoring the
Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme for distributing losses among
creditors. These issues were all at play in Walter Energy's case, as the
secured creditors pushed for a quick sale of the assets instead of a plan of
reorganization (together with the creditor protections inherent in the
plan proposal and confirmation process).
Walter Energy was importantly different in that there is already a
statutory mechanism for sharing restructuring costs among organized
labor and pensioners. These provisions are found, respectively, in
sections 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code. As discussed below,
these are often treated as simply creating the standard for rejecting labor
and pension obligations. However, these sections are better understood
as creating distributional entitlements. Courts have under-appreciated
these distributional entitlements and instead fallen into a line-drawing
exercise between "reorganization" and "sales."
B.

Asset Sale Plus Labor Transformation

While a section 363 sale potentially can scrub away most claims for
successor liability, section 363 cannot eliminate a debtor's obligations
under its CBAs or its retiree benefits.73 Sections 1113 and 1114 are the
exclusive means by which a debtor under Chapter 11 can reject CBAs and
pension obligations, respectively.74 And those provisions provide both

72 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in
Chapter 11,96 TEX. L. REv. 673,674 (2018).
73 Whether or not section 363(f) should in fact be interpreted to allow a trustee to preclude
successor liability claims is up for debate. See George W. Kuney, MisinterpretingBankruptcy Code
Section 363(9 and Undermining the Chapter11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002); Michael H.
Reed, Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales Revisited-A New Paradigm, 61 Bus. LAW. 179
(2005). As a descriptive matter, though, trustees (including debtors-in-possession) do use section
363(f) for this purpose.
74 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a) (2018) ("The debtor in possession... may assume or reject a collective
bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section."); Id. § 1114(e)(1)
("Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the debtor in possession.., shall timely pay and
shall not modify any retiree benefits, except that .... ).
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procedural and substantive requirements that a debtor must meet to
adjust these liabilities.
Sections 1113 and 1114 reflect an attempt to balance the policy goal
of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code with the policies underlying the
federal labor and employment laws. These come in conflict when a
debtor's labor and pension obligations render it unable to continue as a
going concern. In that case, the practical solution would be to allow the
debtor to escape those obligations to the extent necessary to continue
operations. This result would be better for everyone: the debtor remains
in operations and continues to generate revenue that allows it to pay
workers and retirees. As stated by the bankruptcy court in Walter Energy:
This Court recognizes that the miners are the backbone and
crucial workforce in these mining operations. Essentially, the
dilemma facing the Court is whether to shut down the mines or
allow the possibility that the mining operations continue in the
hopes that coal prices will rebound in time and the miners keep
valuable jobs, and are able to benefit when better times and
5
better coal prices occur. 7
At the same time, the power to escape these obligations creates an
incentive for debtors to file bankruptcy even if doing so were not
absolutely essential for the debtor's survival-an incentive that is all the
greater for companies under the control of private equity and other
institutional investors looking to extract value from the debtor.76 This
extraordinary bankruptcy power, coupled with the fact that U.S.
bankruptcy law does not have an insolvency requirement, may make it
more likely that employers would use bankruptcy with the primary
purpose of escaping labor and pension obligations.yy
The language "necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor"
is found in both sections 1113 (CBAs) and 1114 (retiree benefits). The
legislative history for each of these is virtually nonexistent; however,

75 In re Walter Energy, Inc., 542 B.R. 859, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015), affd sub nom. United
Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Plan & Tr. v. Walter Energy, Inc., 579 B.R. 603 (N.D. Ala.
2016), affd sub nom. In re Walter Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2018).
76 Babette A. Ceccotti, Lost in Transformation:The Disappearanceof LaborPolicies in Applying
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 415 (2007).
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understanding the context of each does provide some insights into what
Congress intended in creating this necessary-to-reorganize standard.
C.

Sections 1113&1114

Congress enacted section 1113 immediately in the wake of the
Supreme Court ruling in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, which permitted
debtors to reject CBAs immediately upon filing bankruptcy. 78 In Bildisco,
a building supplies distributorship filed for bankruptcy relief, unilaterally
modified its collective bargaining obligations, and then sought to reject
its CBAs under section 365-the same section that a debtor would use to
reject any "executory contract" (such as an ongoing distributorship
agreement) or unexpired lease. The questions before the Supreme Court
were whether CBAs are "executory contracts" subject to rejection and
whether it is an unfair labor practice to unilaterally modify labor
agreements in bankruptcy.
The Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative:
CBAs are executory contracts subject to rejection under section 365.
Again, this means that CBAs are subject to rejection under the same
statutory provision that would apply to lease agreements and distribution
agreements. At the same time, though, the Court recognized that CBAs
are special, due to their central role under federal labor laws. Thus, the
Court imposed a higher standard that debtors must satisfy before
rejecting CBAs: "If the parties are unable to agree, a decision on the
rejection of the collective-bargaining agreement may become necessary
to the reorganization process."79 And hence, we find the origins of the
necessary-to-reorganize standard.
The Court explained the policy rationale behind this standard as
follows. "Since the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful
rehabilitation of debtors, rejection should not be permitted without a
finding that that policy would be served by such action."80 The Court
went on then to explain further that even though a bankruptcy court is a
court of equity, in ruling on a motion to reject a collective bargaining

78 NLRB v. Bildisco &Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
79

Id. at 526.

8o

Id. at 527.
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agreement, the bankruptcy court's focus should be "only how the equities
relate to the success of the reorganization."81
In considering the unfair labor practices question, the Court held
that it was not an unfair labor practice and that debtors can immediately
and unilaterally modify or reject their CBAs. Although this part is less
relevant for the purposes of this Article, the following passage is helpful
in elucidating further the policy goals driving the decision: "The
fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going
into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of
economic resources."82
Congress immediately added section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code.83
Section 1113 definitely and completely overrules the unfair labor
practices part of Bildisco.84 It also overrules Bildisco as to whether a debtor
under chapter 11 of the Code can use section 365 to reject a collective
bargaining agreement.8 5 Section 1113 says that a debtor "under the
provisions of this chapter... may assume or reject a collective bargaining
agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section."86 But
in setting out the standards for rejection under section 1113, Congress
largely codified the standard created in Bildisco. Most importantly for our
purposes, Congress adopted the necessary-to-reorganize standard.
Section 1113 requires, inter alia, that the debtor propose changes to
the collective bargaining agreement that includes "those necessary
modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are
necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all
creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably."87
The main question following section 1113 was the meaning of
necessary to permit the reorganization:" Did the debtor have to show
that proposed modifications would be the bare minimum amount to
81 Id.
82

Id. at 528.

11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2018).
See id. § 1113(f) ("No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to
unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to
compliance with the provisions of this section.").
83

84

85 See id. § 1113(a).
86

See id.

87

See id. § 1113(b)(1)(A).
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avoid liquidation or did the debtor have to show only that the proposed
modifications would be necessary for a long-term economic recovery?88
Although there is still a split of authority on this question that
divides the two most important corporate bankruptcy courts in the
country, the majority of courts apply the long-term-economic-recovery
standard.89 And even Delaware, which finds itself alone on the other side
of this divide, has never denied a debtor's motion to reject a collective
bargaining agreement in any large corporate reorganization case. 90
Practically, then, the definition of "necessary" maybe irrelevant; however,
a closer look at the split in the case law highlights an aspect to this
standard that gets overlooked. Namely, "necessary to reorganize" is not
just a standard of proof but it is also a distributional entitlement. However
robustly "necessary to reorganize" is interpreted, it provides a loss
distribution scheme as between labor/pensioners and other creditors.
Section 1114, enacted four years after section 1113, is structurally
similar to section 1113 and includes the same "necessary" standard.
Congress enacted this provision in response to the bankruptcy of LTV
Steel, which filed bankruptcy with an estimated two trillion dollars in
unfunded retiree medical benefits.91
When a company goes into bankruptcy with retiree benefit
obligations, there are two issues. The first is how to handle the debtor's
failure to fund the retirement funds and the second is whether the debtor
should be able to modify those obligations going forward-that is, there
is an issue as to retirement benefits plans that have not been funded and
there is the issue of whether the debtor should be relieved of funding
those obligations prospectively.
As to the first issue, Keating argues this is not really a bankruptcy
problem-that is, looking at LTV Steel, the problem with its massive
unfunded retiree benefit plan was not something bankruptcy law could
address.92 There was simply no way the company could pay that amount,
88 See Christopher D. Cameron, How "Necessary"Becamethe Mother ofRejection: An Empirical
Look at the Fate of Collective BargainingAgreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code
Section 1113, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 868-69 (1994).
89

11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A).

90

See Dawson, supra note 17, at 116-17.

91 See Daniel Keating, Transforminga Non-Claim into a Claim: § 1114 and the Curious Case of
In re Visteon, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2011).
92

Id.
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and if the firm were forced to liquidate, those retirees would receive
nothing. A true solution to this problem would be to require pre-funding
plans.93
The second issue is more similar to the issue of modifying collective
bargaining agreement obligations, and the structure is similar (although
the dynamics may be different, as this provision deals with retired
workers and section 1113 deals with active workers).94
Even though that issue is more similar to modifying CBAs, it is
importantly different in that bankruptcy law here is interacting with the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act and, in the coal mining cases,
with the Coal Act. These raise fascinating and important issues, but for
the purposes of this Article, it is enough to note that the gateway
requirement that any court relief as to a retirement plan (just as with a
collective bargaining agreement) requires a finding that the debtor
proposed "necessary modifications ... that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor."95 This narrower focus on this aspect of
section 1114 does not do justice to the complexity of dealing with
retirement funds in corporate reorganization; however, even this narrow
aspect of section 1114 highlights how this provision aimed to balance the
interests of retirees against other claims.96
1.

"Necessary to Reorganize"

As discussed above, debtors may reject their CBAs under chapter 11
only by invoking section 1113, and they may modify their retiree benefit
obligations only under section 1114. Both of these sections have a
necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor" standard. Because

93

Id.

94

Id. at 9.

95

11 U.S.C. § 1114(f)(1)(A) (2018).

For a more complete review of § 1114 and its complexity, see Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis
of the Treatment of Employee Pension and Wage Claims in Insolvency and Under GuaranteeSchemes
in OECD Countries: ComparativeLaw Lessons for Detroitand the United States, 41 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 867, 876 (2014). See also Israel Goldowitz, Response to Professor Paul Secunda's Comparative
Analysis of the Treatment of Employment Claims in Insolvency Proceedings and GuaranteeSchemes
in OECD Countries, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1027 (2014).
96
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section 1114's test is modelled on that of section 1113, this section will
focus on section 1113.
While section 1113 is often cited for having a list of procedural and
substantive requirements, its most important (and analyzed) part is its
double-necessary language: the debtor must propose "necessary
modifications... that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor and assures that that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably."97
This double-necessary language has been interpreted as creating two
separate inquiries: "(1) the standard to be applied, i.e., 'how "necessary"'
must the proposed modifications be, and (2) the object of the 'necessary'
inquiry, i.e., "'necessary" to what."'98 The first of these is distributive, the
second one is substantive. The "how necessary" part is distributive
because it determines how much of the debtor's reorganization value
should be allocated to satisfying the debtor's collective bargaining
obligations. The debtor must pay these in full unless it can show that it
needs to reduce those obligations. The substantive part is the standard the
debtor must satisfy in order to prove that need: Must the debtor show that
the proposed cuts are needed in order to stay in business (i.e., to avoid a
straight liquidation)? Or must the debtor show that the proposed cuts are
needed in order to permit the debtor to compete with its rivals on labor
costs?
The two separate inquiries in the double-necessary test are often
conflated, both in case law and in commentary. Perhaps the most-cited
section 1113 case is In re American Provision Co., cited because it lays out
a nine-part test for section
1113.99
Step three is that

97 11

U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A).

Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d Cir.

98

1986).
99In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), listing the nine-step test:
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the Union to modify the collective
bargaining agreement.

2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable information available
at the time of the proposal.
3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor.

2020]

SELLING OUT

2547

"[t]he proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor."100 There is no step discussing the "how
necessary" test.
The commentary has at times lost track of this distributive "how
necessary test," focusing instead on the substantive test as well. But the
first court of appeals decision to interpret section 1113 dealt precisely
with this issue.101 In Wheeling-Pittsburgh, the issue was whether the
debtor's proposal should have contained a "snap back" provision in order
to prove the modifications were only what was necessary to reorganize.
In that case, the debtor proposed modifications that would reduce labor
costs over a five-year term, based on a pessimistic model of future
earnings. The union argued that these proposed cuts were more than
what was necessary given the possibility that these projected future
earnings were unduly pessimistic. According to the union, the proposal
should have provided that the workers' pay and benefits would "snap
back" to their pre-rejection levels should the company outperform its
pessimistic projections.102
The Third Circuit held the "necessary" standard must take the
absence of a snap back into account. This is not just a question of whether
the proposal was fair and equitable as to the other creditors; rather, the
"how necessary" test reflected congressional intent that cuts to labor

4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
5. The debtor must provide to the Union such relevant information as is necessary to
evaluate the proposal.
6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the hearing on approval
of the rejection of the existing collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must meet at
reasonable times with the Union.
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually
satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining agreement.
8. The Union must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.
100

Id.

lol Wheeling-Pittsburgh,791 F.2d 1074.
12

Id. at 1089.

2548

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:2521

union obligations be as minimal as possible. In other words, that section
1113 created a sort of priority for collective bargaining obligations. 103
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the next to address this
issue, and it was perhaps here where the duality of the necessary standard
got lost: the labor union raised the same argument as in WheelingPittsburgh,but it raised that argument for the first time on appeal. 104 The
Carey court said that the union could not raise the point for the first time
on appeal unless it could show that the result would result in a "manifest
injustice."105 The union, according to the court, failed to make this
showing because it had "wholly failed to demonstrate that Carey's
proposed three-year term was unnecessary or exceeded either the
prevailing industry practices or the parties' past experience."106
The Carey case split from Wheeling-Pittsburgh not on the "how
necessary question but on the "necessary for what" question. Whereas
the Wheeling-Pittsburgh court required the debtor to show that the
proposed modifications were necessary to avoid liquidating, Carey held
that the proposed changes must be necessary "but not absolutely
minimal, changes that will enable the debtor to complete the
reorganization process successfully." 107
Carey has carried the day on this "necessary for what" point. Every
other court of appeals that has addressed the question has found that
debtors need not show that the proposed cuts are the bare minimum to
avoid liquidation. In the process, the distributive entitlement has been
subsumed under the substantive requirement. Questions about the
necessity of snap backs have subsided.
Even in this snap back-less world, the substantive requirement still
does some distributive work: Are the proposed cuts too steep?
Empirically, we know that the "cuts are too steep" argument is a weak
check against debtors' efforts to reject CBAs. Every debtor that has sought
to do so has ultimately succeeded. Yet, even in Carey jurisdictions, the
substantive requirements of section 1113 have done some work. For

103

Id. at 1094.

Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
Am. v. Carey Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
104

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.
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example, American Airlines attempted to reject its CBAs with its pilots,
flight attendants, and transit workers. The court denied the motion even
though the court otherwise found that changes to the existing CBAs were
necessary to permit the debtor's reorganization. 108 Specifically, the court
found that two of American Airlines' proposed changes were
"inconsistent with Section 1113's concept of necessity."109 American
Airlines had proposed changes to the pilot furlough rules and to
codesharing, but it had failed to establish that either was "necessary either
in American's business plan or by the practices of American's
competitors." 110
2.

Consequences of Rejection

However one interprets "necessary to reorganize," another
important aspect that is poorly understood is what happens post
rejection. The Bankruptcy Code itself is silent in this regard. Prior to
sections 1113 and 1114, rejection motions were handled under section
365, the same section that debtors can use to reject unfavorable leases or
other executory contracts. 1 1 Section 365(g) provides that rejection of a
lease would give rise to a breach of contract claim against the estate. 112
When Congress enacted sections 1113 and 1114, there was no similar
provision as to the consequences of rejection. Does the union have a
breach of contract claim against the estate? More importantly, does the
debtor then get to unilaterally impose its proposed modifications on the
existing collective bargaining agreement? Do the parties instead treat the
collective bargaining agreement as if it were expired, requiring the parties
to go back to the bargaining table to work on a new agreement?
Courts have split on this. There are very few reported cases on this,
but court orders granting motions to reject reach different conclusions.
Courts at times specifically allow the debtor to impose its proposed
modifications. At other times, the court simply notes that the old
collective bargaining agreement was rejected (without any discussion of
108

In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 394 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

109

Id.

110Id.
ill 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018); see also John A.E. Pottow, A New Approach to Executory Contracts,
96 TEX. L. REv. 1437 (2018).

112 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
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what "rejection" entails). And at still other times, the court has noted that
the order simply sends the parties back to the table to negotiate a new
deal.
In the coal cases, all of which were sale cases, the court every time
outright rejected the collective bargaining agreement. There were no new
terms to impose, as the debtor was not seeking to adjust its labor costs but
protect the purchaser from any potential labor/pension successor
liability. For example, in PatriotCoal, the court order stated:
For the avoidance of doubt, upon the rejection of the Debtors'
CBAs, the Debtors, over the objection of the UMWA, shall have
no further obligations under the CBAs whatsoever, and any
obligations shall be completely and permanently eliminated,
including the Debtors' obligations to contribute to or participate
in the United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan.113
Likewise, in Walter Energy, the rejection order stated that "the
Collective Bargaining Agreement is REJECTED, and any Sale of Assets
shall be free and clear of encumbrances and liabilities under either the
CBA or with respect to any UMWA Funds."114
In contrast, in reorganization cases such as that of In re Frontier
Airlines Holdings, Inc., the court ordered that the debtor was "authorized
to implement, and perform under, the terms of the Final Proposal."115 In
those cases, the court contemplated that rejection would not simply
"vaporize" the agreement but would require an ongoing relationship and
negotiation between the reorganized debtor and the union. Thus, even if
the union had no claim for damages for rejection, the debtor's obligations
to perform under the collective bargaining agreement were not simply
terminated altogether.

113 Order Authorizing, but Not
Directing, the Debtors to Reject Collective Bargaining
Agreements at 2-3, Parsley v. Blackhawk Mining, LLC (In re Patriot Coal Corp.), 2018 BL 321899
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 6,2018) (No. 3:15-bk-32450).
114 Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Debtors' Motion for an Order (I) Authorizing
the Debtors to (A) Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements, (B) Implement Final Labor Proposals,
and (C) Terminate Retiree Benefits; and (II) Granting Related Relief at 57, In re Walter Energy,
Inc., 542 B.R. 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015) affd sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974
Pension Plan & Tr. v. Walter Energy, Inc., 579 B.R. 603 (N.D. Ala. 2016), affd sub nom. In re Walter
Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 2:15-bk-02741).

115 In re Frontier Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 08-11298 (RDD), 2008 WL 5110927, at *1 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2008).
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The ongoing relationship with the union has distributional
consequences. The union may be forced to take on the cost of the
reorganization, but it receives the benefit of an ongoing relationship with
the reorganized debtor. That is, like other unsecured creditors who
maintain contractual relationships with the debtor, their old debts may
not be paid in full, but they are able to reap at least some benefit from
ongoing contractual relationships.
In sale cases, the courts have instead treated the old agreement as
simply terminated, ending the debtor's liability under the agreements
completely. This has important distributional consequences to the union.
Should the court require that, before approving a labor rejection motion
in a sale case that the purchaser and union negotiate for a new deal?
Should it require the debtor, as part of its good faith negotiations, to
broker such a deal with the purchaser? There is no such statutory
requirement, but such an approach is more consistent with the overall
aim of section 1113. In fact, in Patriot Coal's case, the Asset Purchase
Agreement required that the debtor either reject its collective bargaining
agreement or that the union enter into a new collective bargaining
agreement with the purchaser.116 The debtor, in its motion to reject,
averred that it was working to broker a deal between its union and the
purchaser.117 When the court granted the debtor's rejection motion, it
noted that a proposal had been sent out to the union membership for
approval.
III.

RE-EXAMINATION OF COAL BANKRUPTCY PLAYBOOK

This Section will re-examine the Walter Energy case not as a linedrawing exercise between reorganization and liquidation but instead
focusing on procedural and distributional entitlements. To begin, we can
imagine what Walter Energy's case would have looked like if it had
pursued a reorganization instead of a sale.
Under a traditional reorganization model, Walter Energy would
have needed to file motions under sections 1113 and 1114 to reject its
CBAs and modify its retiree benefits. There might be some dispute as to
whether those cuts were too steep, whether the debtor provided sufficient

116

Asset Purchase Agreement, In re PatriotCoal Corp., 2018 BL 321899 (No. 3:15-bk-32450).

117

Id.
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information to enable the union to analyze the proposal, etc. This would
require looking at each layer of cuts: Did the debtor really need to cut
wages and benefits, to modify work rules, or to make changes to vacation
and sick day policies? And this might involve hiring experts to analyze
the debtor's projected revenues and its labor costs relative to peer
institutions.
Contrast that with what Walter Energy did when it filed its motion
to reject in the context of a sale. All it had to target was the successor
clause. The debtor could show necessity by showing that no one would
purchase the business unless the collective bargaining agreement were
rejected. This argument does not lend itself to much objection. The issue
of necessity does not turn on a factual basis as to projected earnings and
costs. It is simply whether the debtor can prove that the purchaser will
not purchase the business without terminating the CBAs.
Process-wise, then, the quick sale model permits the debtor and its
lenders to sidestep the fact-intensive analysis of the necessity standard by
engineering the reorganization as an asset sale. In the asset sale scenario,
there is no room for the question of whether the cuts were too deep-that
is, the distributive entitlement. There is no standard to permit the court
to protect the labor obligations in the way the court could under a
traditional reorganization framework.
Consequence-wise, we can also see that the choice of reorganization
structure has important consequences. Under a traditional
reorganization, the debtor would propose necessary modifications to the
CBAs. If the motion were granted, the debtor would then be able to
impose those modifications on its existing CBAs.
Contrast that consequence with what happens in the asset sale
scenario. In the asset sale context, the debtor is asking the court to take
out the successorship clause. Once removed, the assets are transferred.
The business then continues under a new management, and the old
collective bargaining agreement is not just modified-it is terminated.
The management will have an obligation under the labor laws to
negotiate with the employees' collective bargaining agent. But the old
collective bargaining agreement is effectively vaporized. This is a
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surprising result given that it is an old bankruptcy adage that the power
to reject contracts is not the power to vaporize them.118
Once we appreciate these differences in processes and consequences,
we can see that the real focus of the issue in Walter Energy should not be
on whether an asset sale is a "liquidation" or a "reorganization" but on
whether the process respects (or sidesteps) section 1113's distributive
requirements.
Such an approach would not attempt to draw lines between
liquidation and reorganization; rather, it would look at the distributional
consequences. For example, the "necessary" test might examine whether
the purchaser has negotiated new CBAs with the existing labor union,
treating that new agreement through the same analysis as it would apply
in a traditional reorganization. Or the court might consider whether the
treatment of the collective bargaining agreement post-rejection will be
greater than what they would have received under a straight liquidationthat is, did the asset sale generate value in excess of the debtor's
liquidation value and will some of that surplus be distributed to the labor
union?
Only by focusing on these procedural and substantive distributions
can a court determine if the quick sale comports with the bankruptcylabor balance that Congress struck in sections 1113 and 1114.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY POLICY AND PRACTICE

This Article has focused primarily on sections 1113 and 1114,
dealing with the way Congress has balanced bankruptcy policy against
labor and retirement benefits policies. But these are not the only nonbankruptcy policies that courts have to balance against chapter 1l's proreorganization goals. Even within the coal industry, there are competing
concerns as courts have to balance the interests of creditors with the
interests of environmental regulators-every dollar spent for

118Pottow, supra note 111, at 1456 (citing Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372,
377 (7th Cir. 2012); Thompkins v. Lil' Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)
("[R]ejection does not embody the contract-vaporizing properties commonly ascribed to
it .... Rejection merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform; it does not make the
contract disappear." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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environmental remediation is a dollar less for the other claimants.119
Bankruptcy courts likewise have to consider other countervailing
policies, from constitutional due process of law, corporate governance,
and federal securities regulations, to name a few. 120
Even though labor and retirement benefits are governed by special
sections of the Bankruptcy Code, the examination of how the quick asset
sale model affects the balance between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
law has implications for the way courts have to strike this balance
generally. Furthermore, the fact that quick asset sales affect how courts
balance bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy policies, even in fields with a
codified balancing test, provides some helpful insights into the ways
bankruptcy judges make decisions.
A.

Sales Restrike the Balance

The coal bankruptcy cases provide a specific illustration of the larger
problem in corporate bankruptcy practice: Distributional norms are
flattened when a secured creditor is in control of the case and, in
particular, when it exercises that control to bring about a quick asset sale.
While Ayotte and Morrison highlight how this creditor-in-control model
can lead to inefficient sales, this Article highlights how these sales can also
work to rebalance bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy policies.
Macey and Salovaara examine this same phenomenon and conclude
that the problem is one of "continuation bias."121 Courts, they argue,

accept overly optimistic asset valuations, in part, because that supports
plans that will keep the debtor in business-even if the debtor's
reorganization plan is not actually feasible. This allows companies to
externalize the external costs of their business, notably the regulatory
costs of their labor, retiree healthcare, and environmental obligations.

119Macey & Salovaara, supra note 5 (analyzing coal mining companies as a way to examine the
interaction of federal bankruptcy law with pension and environmental obligations).
12u David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between CorporateLaw and Corporate Bankruptcy,
72 TEX. L. REv. 471 (1994); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernancein the
Bankruptcy ReorganizationofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993); Daniel
J. Bussel, CorporateGovernance,Bankruptcy Waivers and Consolidation in Bankruptcy, 36 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. (forthcoming 2020-2021).
121

Macey & Salovaara, supra note 5, at 942.
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They are correct that there are many areas in which bankruptcy law
threatens to undermine competing regulatory goals. For instance,
bankruptcy law's respect for corporate separateness can at times facilitate
fraudulent transfer schemes, and a more robust substantive consolidation
remedy might counteract that. 122 This is an important point, and one that
could possibly be well-informed by comparative studies with
jurisdictions, such as Brazil, that have a much more robust substantive
consolidation remedy. 123
They are further almost certainly right that continuation bias plays
a role in elevating bankruptcy policy over non-bankruptcy policies-that
is, in promoting a company's rehabilitation even at the expense of
competing regulatory goals. Indeed, that continuation bias is one way of
explaining why courts have interpreted "reorganization" to include going
concern sales.
The difficulty, of course, comes from determining when a case
should be permitted to "reorganize" and when it should be forced to
"liquidate," a question that is further complicated by the blurriness
between these two outcomes. As illustrated in the academic debates in the
1990s about the "success" rate of chapter 11, the question of whether
bankruptcy courts are good gatekeepers for determining whether debtors
should remain in business is a complicated one, 124 and so is the question
of whether a liquidating chapter 11 plan should be coded as a "success."125
The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database's Success-modeling
Project, for instance, does not define "success" itself, recognizing that
"success" for some scholars focuses on whether the debtor emerged from

122 Id. at 952.
123

See, e.g., STEFAN SAX, MING DONG, CHRISTIAAN ZJDERVELD & THIAGO JUNQUEIRA, INT'L

INSOLVENCY INST., SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER

INSOLVENCIES OF GROUPS OF COMPANIES (2018), https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/
Group%20consolidation%20in%20cross%20%20border%20cases%20%28Dr.%20Stefan%2Sax%
29%20FINAL%20PAPER.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER9J-KC2J] (citing a 2016 study by Professor
Sheila Cerezetti).
124 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the
Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603,611 (2009) (noting "[a]n even more complex question is the meaning
of the 'success' represented by a liquidating plan").
125 See, e.g., UCLA-LOPUCKI
BANKR. RES. DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/7KJD-XGVB].
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bankruptcy as a standalone entity while others might look at the
continuation of the business line. 126
Thus, while this Article recognizes that these are important
questions, it focuses instead on a specific aspect of these coal
reorganization cases that tends to elevate bankruptcy policy over other
regulatory goals-and that is the quick sale model. The process
exacerbates this norm-flattening because it forces the normative dialogue
into the mold of an asset sale motion: Was the sale process reasonably
designed to maximize the value of the estate? There is no room in that
mold to ask questions about feasibility, best interests of the creditors, or
discriminatory treatment among creditors.
In the labor rejection context, we see this clearly. When section
1113's requirements are forced into the mold of an asset sale, the dialogue
changes. Instead of asking when the proposed changes are necessary to
the debtor's reorganization, the union is forced to question only the sale
process. Questions about sale process focus not on bankruptcy's
distributional entitlements but on whether the sale is likely to maximize
the value of the estate. And if the question is whether the sale would yield
more value if stripped of the collective bargaining obligation (and,
consequently, also potentially stripped of the collectively-bargained
retiree benefits), then the answer is always going to be yes.
In short, when bankruptcy's balancing tests are forced through the
procedures of asset sales, the balance of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
interests inevitably (and drastically) tilts toward bankruptcy.
B.

Norm-Power Paradox

These coal bankruptcy cases do more than merely illustrate this
rebalancing aspect of asset sale cases. They also help us think about the
role of bankruptcy courts in corporate reorganization cases. In particular,
they can help us think about Janger's proposed Norm/Power Paradox of
bankruptcy judging. 127
126 Id.; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Bankruptcy Success Modeling Project: A Participant'sGuide, AM.
BANKR. INST. JOURNAL, Aug. 2012, https://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/brd-articles/abi-aug2012lopucki.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFA5-KTD3].
127

Edward J. Janger, Towards a Jurisprudenceof Public Law Bankruptcy Judging, 12 BROOK. J.

CORP., FIN. &COM. L. 12 (2017).
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Examining how bankruptcy judges make decisions, Janger draws on
the public law litigation model and concludes that, "[w]here a relatively
'inarticulate' legal norm regulates a public institution, the need for a
detailed judicial remedy may be greatest precisely where the link to a
specific legal command is at its most tenuous."128 That is, unarticulated
legal norms require a more active judicial role; when legal norms are more
clearly articulated, the judge's role can be much more passive.
To illustrate this, he considers constitutional issues such as school
desegregation in which it is difficult for a judge "to map a broad
constitutional norm onto granular institutional practices."129 Any such
order, then, "may appear to be a naked exercise of judicial power unless
tempered by the techniques of public law judging," for example,
"information gathering, participatory consultation, facilitation and
ultimately consent." 130
Janger extends this to the municipal bankruptcy context, he posits
there exists a similar problem in that context because the broad norms of
debt repayment and sustainable debt load do not map neatly onto a
granular remedy. This puts judges into a public law function, as
"determining the sources of debt repayment and of a sustainable debt
load requires social choices." 131 Just as in the school desegregation cases,
then, the political consequences of any judicial ruling in the municipal
debt restructuring context creates a legitimacy gap: Any ruling, say,
permitting pensioners to recover before bondholders might appear to
lack legitimacy. As David Skeel reports, that was a common reaction by
many experts. 132
In the corporate reorganization context, the political consequences
of favoring secured versus unsecured creditors might be inconsequential;

128

Id. at 49.
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Id.

130

Id.
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Id.

David A. Skeel, Jr., From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit,24 WIDENER L.J. 121, 14546 ("The bond settlement is a classic illustration of the dangers of gifting. If the bondholders were
clearly entitled to full payment and opted to give a portion of their recovery to a lower priority class
such as the pensions, the gift might be defensible. But the bondholders' secured status was in doubt,
which would imply something less than a 100% recovery. This raises serious questions about the
legitimacy of the gift-questions that are in a sense subsumed into the unfair discrimination
analysis, since the effect is to increase the payout to pension recipients.").
132
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however, the consequences of favoring bankruptcy policy over labor
policy are important and serious.
If we try to apply the Norm/Power Paradox in this context, we would
ask whether there was a broad or narrowly defined legal norm the court
must apply. If broad, then the judge should exercise the public litigation
model. If narrow, then less judicial involvement is required. When
applying a broad norm, such as feasibility, we might expect the judge to
engage in more public litigation-style case management: The court
should gather more information and promote and facilitate consent.
When applying more specific norms, that judicial involvement is less
necessary.
Whether the bankruptcy-labor context is one that calls for more
active judicial management depends on whether section 1113 is thought
of as reflecting a broad or narrow norm. If the "necessary to permit the
debtor's reorganization" is viewed simply as asking the question "does the
debtor need to reject the collective bargaining agreement in order to
reorganize?," then this appears to be a fairly narrow norm. Active judicial
management is not necessary, and this dispute looks much more like a
private litigation model. But if the standard is read as asking "are these
proposed modifications necessary?," the norm is much broader, and it is
difficult to map that onto a granular remedy. The section 1113 rejection
process, then, looks to involve more of a public law judging model, with
fact-gathering, consultation, and consensual resolution.
CONCLUSION

This Article examined an important issue raised in a recent Eleventh
Circuit decision in Walter Energy, in an effort to address a much broader
question about bankruptcy law's supremacy. WalterEnergy addressed the
controversial question of when and whether a debtor should be able to
use bankruptcy to reject its CBAs and modify its pension obligations.
This is a difficult, policy-laden question that requires balancing the
interests of bankruptcy law (preserving going concern value, preserving
jobs, minimizing the impact of business failure) with those of labor and
employment laws (enforcing collectively bargaining for agreements,
protecting retiree benefits).
I have argued that the court's analysis of this issue focused on this
wrong question. Instead of focusing on the question of whether a going
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concern sale is a "reorganization" for purposes of section 1113, the court
should have focused on whether the proposed modifications to the
collective bargaining agreement would allocate some of the
reorganization surplus to the labor union. That is, would the structure of
the reorganization honor and respect the distributional entitlements
Congress created when enacting section 1113?
The failure to honor these entitlements raises policy questions of
particular concern in the field of labor and employment law. Further, it
illustrates the way that current chapter 11 practice permits debtors and
their powerful creditors to engineer a reorganization and sidestep the
distributional entitlements Congress baked into chapter 11.

